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The U.S. mortgage loan foreclosure crisis has become the biggest risk facing the U.S. economy. 
In August 2007, the National Association of Business Economists named the combined effects of 
subprime debt defaults and excessive personal and corporate debt as the greatest short-term 
threat to the U.S. economy. There are two distinct channels of influence of the subprime problem 
that raise concern. The first is the rise in default and foreclosure that affects homeowners, 
lenders, neighborhoods and the real estate industry most directly.  This was the focus of the 
recent Networks Financial Institute Financial Forum, The Foreclosure Crisis: Its Causes, 
Consequences and Remedies, held August 28, 2007 in Indianapolis.  The second channel is 
financial, flowing from the effects on lenders’ financial viability and on financial markets. The 
second channel has become more visible and dominant in popular discussions of the issues since 
mid-August 2007. 
  
  The timing of developments in these two channels will determine how fast consumers and 
business work through these problems and restore stability and growth to the nation’s housing 
and financial markets. The bottom line is that the problem is rooted in housing markets and these 
markets are likely to be very slow to adjust and to eliminate difficulties. It takes time for good 
mortgages to go bad and for bad mortgages to move from delinquency in payments to the 
initiation of the foreclosure process.  It also takes time from initiation of the process until the 
process ends with the sale of a property to a new owner and the distribution of the losses to 
affected parties. Thus no matter how quickly financial markets adjust, the effects of the 
foreclosure problem, even those working though financial markets, will continue to play out for 
at least another year. 
  
  While financial markets work much more quickly, they will be held hostage to the unfolding 
effects of the foreclosures in the housing markets and among lenders. Asset pricing is forward 
looking, which means that buyers and sellers of financial instruments base the value of assets on 
the future cash flows expected from assets and today’s estimates of the risks associated with 
realizing those expected cash flows. Thus, for example, financial markets process a spike in the 
default rate on home mortgages into the value of mortgages and related assets very quickly.  
Firms are failing because of the changes in asset prices or because they are unable to meet the 
financial demands of their creditors. They will continue to do so as realizations of losses and 
their location in the global marketplace unfold.  Unfortunately these losses will arise in the 
mortgage loan sector as defaults and foreclosure continue to rise over the next year or so, but 
also the losses will plague firms that hold these loans or related securities as major assets, even if 
they have taken write-downs on asset values already or in the next few months. 
  
The emerging foreclosure problem 
  
  The national foreclosure problem did not become very visible until late 2006. The 
national foreclosure rate began to rise from about one percent at that time and reached 1.7 
percent in the third quarter of 2007.  But subprime loans, which are loans to borrowers with 
relatively low credit scores and records of poor credit performance or little credit experience, had 
become a large share of all mortgages by then.  Other higher risk mortgages include credit extended by the federal Housing Administration (FHA) and so-called “alt-A” loans, which are 
loans to borrowers usually with prime credit scores, but who do not provide any documentation 
(“no-doc”) of income or wealth or ability to service pay the loan, or very little documentation 
(“low-doc”).  They have been reported to constitute over 10 percent of all mortgages. When all 
three categories are added together, nearly 30 percent of loans outstanding are estimated to be in 
the high-risk category. 
  
  Both subprime loans and FHA loans have foreclosure rates that are much higher than that for 
prime loans. These loans alone, without considering alt-A loans, make up about 65 percent of the 
loans in foreclosure. The table shows some data from earlier this year that provides some 
perspective on the beginnings of the problem nationally, and the severity of the problem in 
Indiana, which has ranked first or second in the nation in foreclosures since 2001. The subprime 
problem is largely an adjustable rate problem.  As shorter-term interest rates, to which adjustable 
rate loans are typically tied, rose in 2004-2006, prime borrowers and even better-advised FHA 
borrowers shifted to fixed mortgage rate loans. About 80 percent of prime borrowers and about 
90 percent of FHA borrowers have fixed rate loans. In contrast, 58 percent of subprime 
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Prime      1.40%  573,745    8,032      69.5%     32.7% 
Subprime  9.57 122,033  11,679  14.8  47.5 
FHA  3.95  107,198    4,234  13.0  17.2 
All loans  2.98  825,008  24,585      100.0       100.0 
United States 
Prime  0.54  33.924,965   183,195  78.6   32.6 
Subprime  5.10    5,878,011  299,779  13.4   53.4 
FHA  2.19    2,981,809    65,302    6.8   11.6 
All loans  1.28  43,895,066  561,857     100.0  100.0 
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association 
 
It will get worse due to the importance of subprime resets 
  
  The origins of the problem date back to 2004-2006 when a large share of new mortgage loans 
were made to subprime borrowers, borrowers who had relatively low credit scores and could not 
qualify for conventional mortgage loans at normal market interest rates.  Many of these loans 
began to default much earlier than the normal experience from the past. In fact, some of them 
went into default without ever making a payment. As the marginal adjustable-rate loans begin to adjust in coming months and for the next year or so, the foreclosure rate is expected to spike 
further. Many of these loans will have interest rates that adjust up from low “teaser” rates, 
making their already high subprime rates unaffordable, even if short-term interest rates remain 
the same or fall. 
  
 According  to  the Financial Times (September 26, 2007), the average adjustable rate mortgage 
was offered at 7 percent in 2005-06.  These loans will reset to 9.45 to 10.85 percent in their 
initial reset, according to Deutsche Bank and Loan Performance.  Such an increase would raise 
principal and interest payments from $ 665.30 to $837.21 to $941.06 for each $100,000 
borrowed, or 25 to 41 percent.  These rates are expected to spike in the 12-18 months beginning 
in November 2007.  This also highlights that the time is short for the portion of these borrowers 
who currently can afford their current mortgage payments, but not the higher ones, and their 
lenders, to take action to avoid this spike.    
  
  The U.S. Treasury has announced plans for major lenders to voluntarily freeze teaser rates for 
up to five years to lessen the impact of the crisis.  But only lenders who are current on their loan 
payments and can afford their teaser rates can qualify for help. Congress is also working on 
legislation that will make it easier for homeowners with subprime loans to refinance with fixed-
rate FHA, if they can qualify.  This program is expected to benefit about 200,000 to 300,000 
borrowers, but the magnitude of the problem will far exceed this.  The Federal Reserve has also 
issued a request for comments on new proposed regulation that would make it difficult for 
borrowers and lenders to repeat many of their mistakes from the past.  As future comments and 
actions will show, however, these proposals will make it more costly or impossible for low-
income first-time buyers to access credit markets to obtain financing, yet it was these 
opportunities for unconventional finance that led millions of borrowers, who otherwise would 
not have been able to buy homes, to successfully transition into home ownership. For example, 
Gerardi, Rosen and Willen (2007) find that borrowers today are more able to access housing 
based on their long-term expected income than they have been earlier because of new 
innovations on credit markets.  This possibility could be taken away by new rules proposed by 
the Fed. Interestingly, they also find that the growth of the government sponsored enterprises 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have had no effect on such access, despite that being their principle 
mission. 
  
  Most estimates of the impact of foreclosure on the housing market show that it has 
reduced real GDP growth by about one percentage point since spring 2006; with the continuing 
drops in housing starts, this effect is expected to be no larger than this through the end of 2008. 
Housing starts peaked in late 2005 and January 2006, when starts hit 2.3 million per year.  Since 
then, starts have plummeted nearly in half, to 1.2 million (September-November 2007). While 
there is some slowing in the pace of decline, there is little evidence that the end of the decline is 
imminent. 
  
  The pace of house price increases also slowed after 2005.  During 2005, house prices rose at a 
peak 9.5 percent rate faster than consumer prices, using the house price index measured by the 
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). Since then, the pace of relative price 
increase has slowed to -0.3 percent over the year ending in the third quarter of 2007.  Further 
slowing cannot be ruled out; it is possible that the relative price will decline and many analysts have suggested that the actual house price index could fall.  The Standard & Poors’ Case-Shiller 
house price index for 20 cities (prone to having the largest cyclical swings in house prices) 
shows declines at about a five percent annual rate for the past two quarters, but this is not 
reflected in the broader national measures. Some of these cities actually had price bubbles in the 
recent years, though this was not the case on a national basis using the OFHEO or other 
measures. The key conclusion is that there is no recession that can be expected from the housing 
sector consequences of the foreclosure problem, though some analysts, based on an expected 
worsening of the problem or the credit market influences of foreclosures, point to substantial risk 
of recession. 
  
  Some analysts focus on the influence of the foreclosure crisis on consumer spending instead 
of residential construction. The value of residential housing assets in the United States is about 
21 trillion (third quarter 2007), about 28 percent of total household assets.  Some fear that the 
foreclosure crisis will lead to a sharp reduction in household wealth and lead consumers to 
attempt to boost saving and cut spending in order to rebuild wealth. See Mishkin (2007) for 
example.  Others question whether there is likely to be such a sharp reduction, and should it 
occur, that it will be sufficiently powerful to affect consumer spending appreciably (see Stafford, 
for example). 
  
The financial effects of the foreclosure problem 
  
  The other prong of the foreclosure problem is financial; every mortgage that is foreclosed 
results in someone losing their house and having to bear transitional housing costs and the loss of 
what is for them sometimes a large loss in the equity they had in a house. The greater costs of 
losing a home through foreclosure are the so-called “psychic costs” in embarrassment, self-
confidence and self-esteem for parents and children, as well as the damage of a deflated credit 
rating on the ability to find work, to secure a new residence, including a rented one, to acquire 
insurance, to get credit or to secure any good or service that carries future responsibilities for 
payment. The biggest financial losses, however, usually accrue to the mortgage lenders and those 
who have financed them. 
  
  In early 2007, mortgage lenders, particularly “mono-line” lenders, who only do mortgage 
lending, began to fail in large numbers, either because they held relatively large asset positions in 
subprime loans that were moving into delinquency or losing value because of expectations that 
they would, or because of the decline in the lending business. Over 70 mortgage companies went 
into bankruptcy or out of business in the first quarter of this year. American Century was the first 
of the major mono-line mortgage lenders to exit the industry. Other large mortgage lenders that 
have failed or are in bankruptcy include American Home Mortgage and First American 
Mortgage.  Many large financial providers exited the subprime business, including H&R Block, 
Nomura Securities, Lehman Brothers and Countrywide Mortgage. 
  
Beginning in the spring and summer of 2007, hedge funds, large and small, went out of business 
because of losses on collateralized debt packages that they held and that were based on payments 
on subprime loans.  Best known are the near half-billion dollar losses at UBS’ hedge fund Dillon 
Read, due to about $150 million in direct losses and related liquidation costs, and the $2 billion 
in losses at two Bear Stearns funds that threatened the viability of the firm. Sowood Capital lost $1.5 billion, half its fund, before being sold to Citaldel Investment Group.  Major investment 
banks, including Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Bear Stearns Lehman Bros., 
Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank and UBS, lost 15 to 30 percent of their market capitalization in 
July and August.  Dozens of hedge funds have closed in July and August because of large 
subprime related losses and a lack of liquidity. 
  
  The U.S. subprime crisis spread to other countries. U.K.-based Calibur Capital lost 82 percent 
of its $900 million hedge fund because of subprime related losses and will be closed.  Basis 
Capital in Australia announced that one of its funds, part of a $1 billion group. could lose half its 
value, due to subprime and structured credit tied to subprime loans, while others including 
Absolute Capital in Australia and BNP Paris announced suspensions of redemptions and 
withdrawals because of subprime losses. 
  
  The worst phase of the process, at least from the perspective of financial market losses, came 
during the week of August 9, 2007 when two state-owned German banks were bailed out. It was 
these potential failures that led credit markets to seize up and to the massive intervention, over 
$130 billion, by the European Central Bank.  The Federal Reserve responded in kind, though not 
in scale, by injecting funds into the credit market, lowering the discount rate, and forming a 
consortium of major banks to borrow at the discount window to show that it is all right to borrow 
from the Fed to further its attempt to prop up the most hard hit markets for short-term financial 
and commercial credit. The loan volume in the asset-backed commercial paper market declined 
about 6 percent or $90 billion in the week ending August 23 because this paper was partially 
backed by an unknown but small proportion of subprime mortgages 
  
  The asset-backed commercial paper market shrank in August because of the realization that 
most of the pools of assets that backed this commercial paper contained varying shares of 
subprime mortgages of varying risk of default and foreclosure. Hedge funds following this model 
and other firms dependent on the commercial paper market have reduced the supply of these 
assets by more than the decline in demand, so that interest rates on these instruments actually fell 
throughout August and September.  The shrinkage in the commercial paper market has resulted 
in other credit products being dumped on markets besides subprime loans.  More and more funds 
are surfacing that have financed long-term and illiquid structured asset holdings with short-term 
asset backed commercial paper.  Many of these firms have prime brokerage arrangements, which 
provide servicing of financial transactions, and credit, with major investment banks so that the 
spillover effects fall on major banks, jeopardizing bank capital. Most analysts expected the 
subprime problem to be contained among specialized mortgage lenders and hedge funds, and, 
more importantly, for there to be little effect on banks or other systemic effects on the banking 
system. 
  
  The spread of the subprime loan problem to institutions that had heavy exposure to such 
loans quickly was augmented by institutions that financed themselves issuing asset-backed 
commercial paper.  Even if they remained solvent after their losses on the subprime related 
assets, their ability to refinance their short-term debt positions became impossible. The only 
recourse was to obtain alternative financing or begin to liquidate assets whose value had 
certainly fallen but was unclear and too risky in a cautious market. Not surprisingly, analysts 
began to talk about credit markets that were seizing up, or even a credit crunch. These developments mushroomed when it became clear that banks, the one group of institutions that 
investors thought relatively more immune, began to exhibit similar problems. 
  
  In part, the expectation that major financial firms and banks would be insulated from the 
effects of the foreclosure problem was based on the well-capitalized position of the nation’s 
banks.  Cracks in this story widened following bailouts and the failure of Sachsen LB in 
Germany. The crisis spread to Northern Rock, the fifth largest mortgage lender in the United 
Kingdom, which suffered the first run on a British bank since the Overend, Gurney and Co. run 
in 1866. This bank had also come to rely on non-deposit commercial paper financing and when 
that dried up there was a run on the small amount of deposits it had relative to its assets.  The 
most significant failure in the United States was that of NetBank, a $2.5 billion internet bank 
based in Georgia that had taken on a portfolio of subprime mortgages and whose lending activity 
had resulted in losses of $200 million in 2006 alone.  This was the largest US bank to fail since 
1993 and only the second failure of the year. 
  
  Countrywide, the largest mortgage firm and mainly a prime mortgage lender, was the first to 
suggest that subprime problems were migrating to prime loans, especially home equity credit 
lines, when they announced a sharp reduction in second quarter earnings on July 24, 2007.  
Subsequently speculation over the trouble at Countrywide led to large stock price declines and a 
liquidity problem that forced them to take up all of an $11 billion credit line and to sell $2 billion 
in convertible preferred stock to Bank of America. Countrywide announced the elimination of its 
Full Spectrum subsidiary, its subprime and alt-A lending arm, and its wholesale division, which 
arranged loans through brokers, on August 20, 2007.  It later announced the layoff of about 20 
percent of its 60,000 workers.  By late September, along with other indicators of a return to 
normality, Countrywide announced that its deposits had begun to rise in response to its offer of 
above-market interest rates. 
  
  On the financial market side of the foreclosure crisis, employment has already declined, with 
88,000 jobs in the finance sector lost in the first eight months of this year.  In just the 10 days 
from August 13 to August 23, 2007, the Wall Street Journal found about 12,000 announced job 
losses at mortgage companies in the subprime and alt-A loan areas. 
  
  By October 2007, many signals suggested that the pressures on global financial markets were 
easing.  Pressures on the Federal Reserve to provide liquidity through its discount window had 
eased and primary credit through this facility had declined to an average of $88 million in the 
week ending September 26 after peaking at $2.9 billion during the week ending September 12.  
Before the credit crisis and bank failures in Europe around August 9
th, such credit had been 
nearly zero. Other signs of easing include the fact that prime 30-year fixed rate mortgages have 
had lower interest rates since August 9 and government securities, especially short-term 
securities, had lower yields following August 9, than they had at the beginning of the crisis.  The 
flight to quality that lowered the three-month Treasury bill rate from 4.77 percent on average for 
the week ending August 3 to a low of 3.62 percent two weeks later, rose back to 3.93 the week 
before the Fed cut its federal funds rate target by 50 basis points to 4.75 percent.  Treasury yields 
with maturities from 2 - 10 years continued to fall until the Fed action and then began to rise, 
though they remained well below pre-crisis levels. 
    
  It is far too early to know how this crisis will play out. The seizing up of credit markets 
appears to have come to an end, though the market for subprime mortgages is moribund, as is the 
market for securitized debt based on asset pools containing them. While asset-backed 
commercial paper volume outstanding continues to fall and is down from nearly 1.2 trillion in 
early August 2007 to 0.8 trillion in December, it was replaced, when borrowing firms were credit 
worthy, by a large increase in the volume of commercial bank and institutional money market 
lending.  To finance these loans, banks have increased issuance of certificates of deposit, and 
institutional money funds have expanded, as higher rates than earlier attracted the funds that 
formerly were invested in asset-backed commercial paper. Jumbo mortgages, those for more than 
$417,000 that cannot be bought and securitized or held by the government-sponsored credit 
institutions Fannie Mae or Freddy Mac, have faced a more limited private market and their rates 
have risen to exceed conforming loan rates by a full percentage point or more, making these 
loans more expensive for borrowers than they were before August 9
th, at least until early 
October. The spread between conforming and these non-conforming loans spiked to about a full 
percentage point, more than twice the previous leak level of about 50 basis points seen in 
previous periods of stressed credit markets. 
  
  Major international banks continue to register losses. UBS, for example, warned of third-
quarter 2007 losses of about $2.5 to $3.4 billion on its fixed income operations, including the 
effects of subprime mortgage-related assets.  Deutsche Bank warned of losses of $3 billion for 
the same reasons and Citigroup warned of losses of nearly $6 billion, including $1.3 billion for 
losses due to subprime loans, but much of the rest due to losses on consumer credit and mark 
downs of leveraged.  Similarly, Morgan Stanley announced third quarter losses of $940 million 
on leveraged loans and another $41 billion for fixed income, mainly mortgages and other trading 
positions.  Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns each announced $700 million losses for the third 
quarter, due to debt write-downs.    These are just a few of the major losses reported. The global 
financial sector has survived the credit crisis that began in Europe on August 9, 2007 quite well.  
Whether more bouts of failure and selective freeze up in some corner of the credit market will 
reappear is anyone’s guess. But it does appear that the credit markets and banks are much more 
resilient and stronger than had been believed in mid-August and can adjust quickly and relatively 
painlessly to a breakdown in confidence or trust in various credit instruments. The CEOs of 
many large banks have lost their jobs, including those of UBS, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, and 
Merrill Lynch, and insolvencies and more job losses are expected to continue for some time. 
  
  In December 2007 another round of liquidity problems surfaced as end-of-year liquidity 
demand of financial institutions led to a spike in borrowings from central banks, and new 
facilities for longer term borrowing reaching 90 days in the United Kingdom. For example, bank 
borrowing from the Fed averaged $3 billion in the week ending December 13, 2007, rivaling the 
temporary peak in September. One of the ironies of the situation is continued talk of “frozen” or 
“seized up” market and a credit crisis.  Among financial experts, financial market thinking is 
dominated by concepts of rational agents participating on forward-looking, self-correcting 
markets. In this case, markets cannot seize up or fail.  Prices adjust rapidly to restore market 
balance.  Yet “Special investment vehicles” or SIVs (shades of Enron), and other issuers of asset 
backed securities, are said to face frozen markets.  Historically, this is a claim made in 
employment markets and other non-financial markets that refer to situations where market participants refuse to trade at existing prices.  Nothing is frozen except their unwillingness to 
trade and that thaws as soon as it is clear that there are no better opportunities, such as being 
bailed out or allowed to hold failed assets on your books without taking losses. Early efforts to 
create a consortium to hold these assets at unchanged or little changed prices have failed, so 
banks are taking these assets back on their books and financing them internally. Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae, along with banks, have recently launched efforts to avoid taking losses on loan 
guarantees, the next stage of the crisis, but are not likely to escape realizing losses in any 
meaningful sense, such as valuation, solvency or failure risk. 
  
What credit crunch? 
  
  The notion of a credit crisis is equally problematical. The simplest evidence of a credit crunch 
is that the scarcity of credit would drive up the price of credit. But with few exceptions, interest 
rates have fallen since early August 2007; moreover they fell before the Fed began to lower the 
federal funds rate target and they continued to fall and by more than the Fed cuts at least until 
recently, when inflation and policy risk scares began to push rates higher, at least temporarily. 
Most interest rates are far below levels of early August.   The key instruments that have exhibited 
higher levels are jumbo mortgage rates, where there has been some uncertainty about their 
marketability, and bank CD rates where the switch in funding from SIVs through asset-backed 
commercial paper has switched to bank financing along with funds from institution money 
market funds. Another market where there is upward pressure is the London inter-bank offering 
rate, a rate for loans between banks in London.  Due to the discovery of an absence of an 
efficient and quick resolution method for bank insolvencies in Britain, loans there have taken on 
unusual risk.  But even dollar-denominated loan rates there are lower than they were in August.   
Bank lending and money market institutions have expanded much more than the decline in asset-
backed commercial paper since early August. 
  
  Besides a generally declining cost of credit, it is also the case that bank lending has 
accelerated since July, at least according to weekly and monthly seasonally adjusted data from 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. From the week ending August 5, just before the crisis 
became apparent, to December 5 2007, bank credit at all institutions has grown $458.3 billion or 
at a 16.9 percent annual rate.  This 17-week advance is much faster than the 7.4 percent rate over 
the previous 35 weeks, an increase of $420.7 billion.  Clearly credit growth has accelerated.  
Money funds have also grown rapidly making far more short-term credit available. Institutional 
money funds surged up $326.6 billion from July 2007 to November, a 79.1 percent annual rate, 
up from a $200 billion rise or 23.5 percent rate in the previous eight months.  These two major 
sources of short term credit have seen explosive growth since the supposed credit crunch began.  
It is important to bear in mind, however, that while total credit is expanding rapidly, there are 
areas where borrowers are reluctant or refuse to pay the premiums them would have to pay to 
continue to secure the short-term credit they had during the summer of 2007.  This is especially 
the case with SIVs and others dependent on asset backed commercial paper. 
  
Outlook 
  The second prong of the foreclosure crisis, the financial industry effects, remains a threat to the 
overall economy’s performance.  Many analysts fear that a generalized collapse in confidence in 
lending in credit markets could lead to a recession.  Various industry leaders put the risk of recession at nearly a 50-50 bet.  For example, on September 27, 2007, Richard Syron, CEO of 
Freddie Mac, warned that the housing market downturn had led to a 40-45 percent chance of 
recession.  Alan Greenspan in December 2007 put the risk at 50 percent. 
  
  Forecasting the size of the future spike in foreclosures is difficult.  There is only limited 
experience with nontraditional loans and subprime loans.  Subprime (and alt-A) loans are about 
25 percent of all mortgages.  At worst, in early 2002, foreclosures on subprime loans hit about 15 
percent. A repeat of this experience with the now-larger share of subprime loans could mean that 
subprime foreclosures alone could raise the overall foreclosure rate by 4 percent.  With the 
remainder running slightly above normal, say around one percent, the overall foreclosure rate 
would reach about 4.75 percent, almost four times the current rate and the highest since the 
Mortgage Bankers Association began collecting data. It is not implausible that the foreclosure 
rate on subprime loans could be far worse, say double the 2002 level, or 30 percent.  In that case, 
the overall foreclosure rate would reach more than 8 percent. Such a level would mean about 1.6 
to 3.2 million home loans in foreclosure at the peak and this would have serious consequences 
for the housing industry, housing prices and, at the top end, for the economy. 
  
  An overall foreclosure rate of 5 percent to 8 percent for 2008 would represent, at most, about 
$551 to $882 billion. Virtually all of any losses on these mortgages accrue to lenders and they in 
turn typically lose up to half the value of the mortgage. So the losses to lenders could mount to 
$275 to $440 billion.  Estimates of losses taken by the largest banks are in the $30 billion range, 
so the accounting realization of losses over the next 12 to 18 months has only just begun. But 
banks do not hold the lion’s share of these mortgages, either in the United States or abroad.  
Moreover, the worst-case loss on foreclosed mortgage loans is not a large number relative to the 
size of annual growth in wealth, debt and lending, nor is the consequent loss of capital a severe 
constraint on lending and credit, as some analysts have suggested. Besides, capital constrained 
lenders can readily reduce investments to boost loans as price signals in competitive markets will 
instruct them to do. At the end of the third quarter of this year, banks held about $4 trillion on 
residential mortgages and home equity loans ($2.8 trillion) and in mortgage-backed securities 
($1.2 trillion), which is about 30 percent of total banking assets. A loss of half on as many as 5 
percent of mortgages and these securities would represent about 1.5 percent of total assets and 15 
percent of total equity. None of these figures would pose a serious threat to lending or bank 
failure in an industry where 99 percent of institutions surpass the highest regulatory capital 
standards, although some institutions with more concentrated exposure or worse default 
experience could fail. 
  
  Financial markets have exhibited considerable resiliency, but further adverse developments 
could lead to further turmoil. There is no credit crunch, only isolated and temporary market 
effects that force credit markets to alter the channel of lending and borrowing and where greater 
awareness of and sensitivity to risk is priced into market interest rates. Unexpected shocks could 
disrupt the market recovery, especially because the foreclosure spike looms out in the future and 
its full extent and timing remains subject to some uncertainty.  It is much too early to determine 
whether the credit market disruption could have recessionary effects, though so far overall credit 
supplies do not appear to be much disrupted, nor are most interest rates higher. 
  
  Of course after the shocks of August and September 2007, interest rates could rise with recovery in markets or change because of further central bank action or changes in inflation 
expectations. This year will be important in financial history. It has provided the first major test 
to financial markets for securitized loans and related financial derivatives, for structured finance 
programs, and for related business models. It is also the first year of the unraveling of the 
adjustable-rate mortgage crisis that is expected to dominate housing markets in 2008.  Whether 
there is a recession arising from these historical events will mainly depend on the continuing 
resilience of financial markets and the credibility of policymakers to respond quickly and 
decisively to further credit market disruptions. At least until recently, however, credit market 
developments do not point to a developing recession. 
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